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Uniform and standardized payments methods considerably reduce transaction costs and therefore make 
payments more efficient. This is especially true for purchases and sales on the internet where all kinds of 
payment innovations considerably enhance the payments customer journey for e-commerce transactions. 
The role of the government in this respect is to safeguard the various aspects of the public interest of the 
payments system. Here various arguments for government intervention from public sector economics 
come to the fore. More specifically, a response of regulators is needed with respect to the entry of new 




Payments between buyers and sellers bring about numerous transaction costs. Firstly, these are direct, 
"hard" or tangible transaction costs. Most intermediaries in the payments system will pass these costs to 
customers in their tariffs. But more important are the indirect or "soft"  (intangible) transaction costs for 
customers of payment services, such as the costs of understanding how a payment must be made - 
depending on standardization and frequency of payments (see Williamson, 1985, pp. 60-61) -, the costs 
of information about the reliability of the payment product, the costs of changes in the value of the means 
of payment (exchange rate, inflation), the costs of falsifications and fraud, the costs of repair in the event 
of an incorrect payment and the costs of technical problems and theft of data for internet payments. 
 
The major goal of innovations in payment transactions is to reduce these transaction costs as much as 
possible. If this reduction of costs ultimately benefits the consumer, it will generate welfare gains. 
Sometimes the market will automatically provide such welfare gains, but there is a public interest at stake 
when intervention by the government can help to maximize the welfare gains to be made. This paper 
discusses and elaborates the arguments that the theory of public sector economics offers for the 
regulation of innovations in the payments system. These arguments relate to the public good character of 
the payments system, to competition policy, to solving the game of trust through institutional 
arrangements, to external effects and to eliminating information asymmetry. Examples from the past, 
present and the future with emphasis to the situation in the Netherlands are reviewed.   
 
Payments system as public good 
 
Payment transactions have the character of a public good from the condition that the use of the payments 
system it is to be non-rival and non-excludable. From that perspective, intermediaries in the payments 
system are subject of supervision and regulation by the monetary authorities. But these authorities 
traditionally also offer a payment product themselves, in the form of banknotes. A number of innovations 
have in the past led to lower transaction costs when using banknotes. We mention some examples from 
The Netherlands. Statistical analysis using large samples of normal banknotes and banknotes reinforced 
with flax showed that the latter type of banknotes became less polluted than flaxless notes (Den Butter 
and Coenen, 1982). In addition, starting with the banknotes designed by Oxenaar in the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s (the Snip (fl.100), Zonnebloem (fl.50) and the Lighthouse (fl.250)) the user is explicitly 
informed on the banknotes themselves on a number of security features. In addition brochures are 
published which clearly describe how genuine banknotes can be recognized. Moreover, banknotes have 
been made, through the design, good looking as it appears that when users like the notes they also pay 
more attention to the security features (Den Butter, 1985). 
 
The payments system also has to do with legal protection, and thus with law enforcement as a public 
good. Protection of privacy is a prominent example. Here there is a balancing of transaction costs in order 
to come to the warranted level of privacy protection. On the one hand, infringement of privacy may mean 
transaction costs and loss of wealth, but on the other hand suppliers of payment products can sell 
information obtained with big data (recently restricted by the General Data Protection Regulation; GDPR), 
so that fewer or no costs for payment transactions need to be passed on to customers. Another aspect of 
law enforcement concerns the contribution of the payments system to the prevention of the use of money 
in criminal activities, such as tax fraud and money laundering. This question came to the fore in the 
Netherlands when it became clear in the late 1980’s that the extensive holding of the banknotes of NLG 
1,000 was barely traceable and that this note was mainly used for hidden payments (Boeschoten and 
Fase, 1988). The idea at the time was that the supply of banknotes should in any case follow demand, for 
whatever transactions. This argumentation has apparently changed now that the ECB has decided to 
withdraw the € 500 note. The same question arises for the interference of the regulators in the payments 
system with the bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies. The low turnover rate and use on dark web suggests 
that this cryptocurrency is mainly used in the shadow economy. That is why recently monetary authorities 
have issued warnings for the use of these cryptocurrencies (see for instance Lagarde, 2018). 
 
Trust in the payments system 
 
A major aspect related to the public good character of the payments system is that money has a fiduciary 
character. It means that the value of the money is independent of the value of the material from which the 
money is made. That is true for gold and silver coins and for the heavy stones, the fei, which were used 
as money on the island of Yap (Furness III, 1910). It also applies to the banknotes, and certainly to our 
bank account money that is only digitally stored somewhere as a number. It means that a reputation of 
reliability needs to be built for various types of money to be accepted as a means of payment. The trust 
that payments are handled correctly, without uncertainty and under continuous supervision, is essential to 
keep costs low in all kinds of (trade) transactions. In fact building up and maintaining trust in the 
payments system brings about a number of transaction costs.  
When the fiduciary nature of the money is reduced, for example through reduced reliability of the 
payments system, the costs to be incurred in individual transactions will increase. This is also the case 
when there is insufficient transparency because, for example, the conditions of the payment products are 
not clearly communicated or when there are too many different payment products. This means that 
consumers have to make additional search costs in order to obtain the necessary information. This in turn 
may reduce the number of transactions and thus be harmful to the economy. It shows that, due to the 
fiduciary nature of the money, it is a public interest to avail of a well-functioning and transparent payments 
system, and to ensure the efficiency, security and reliability of the system. That is why supervision from 
the government, in this case delegated to monetary authorities, is indispensable. The major upshot is that 
the supervisory authorities of the payments system provide a good infrastructural and institutional 
structure in order to guarantee a solution to the game of trust which keeps transaction costs low. Such 
solution to the game of trust entails that all partners in a transaction keep their promises and refrain from 
cheating and opportunistic behaviour (Greif, 2000, 2006).  
   
The fiduciary nature of money is not only relevant to the transactions demand for money. The 
precautionary demand for money also requires a stable and reliable payments system, and so does the 
speculative demand for money. With respect to these motives for holding money, inflation should be 
avoided as much as possible - not a problem in most advanced western economies at the moment - but 
when capital is accumulated, for instance as pension savings, trust that the monetary value is guaranteed 
and is not affected by fraud or stress in the financial system, is essential. 
 
Fraud is a major threat to trust in the payments system. For example, there are more and more 
sophisticated ways of phishing that can harm the unsuspecting recipient of internet messages about 
payments by making unjust payments and / or malware infecting the computer (framework). From the 
perspective of transaction costs, phishing can lead to a breach of trust, in the sense that the consumer 
can no longer distinguish between good and fraudulent internet messages about payments. This creates 
a 'lemons' problem (Akerlof, 1970) in which every message is seen as potentially fraudulent. Obviously it 
is a public interest that such fraud is actively battled by the authorities, for instance through good 




An important reason for government intervention in securing the public interest is market failure. There 
must be sufficient competition between parties in the payments system, so that not an unnecessary part 
of the reduction of the transaction costs is appropriated as profit by those parties. On the other hand, too 
great a diversity of payment products and standards increases the transaction costs. Thus a middle way 
has to be found between competition and coordination in the regulation of innovations in the payments 
system.  
 
A good example of a standard that does not hinder competition is the iDEAL internet payment scheme in 
the Netherlands. iDEAL offers  a standard for e-commerce payments. When payments through iDEAL are 
made, customers are directly connected to their own bank. It implies that iDEAL is neutral with regard to 
the bank of the party making the payment. So it is a neat combination of getting the benefits from one 
standard while leaving room for competition between banks and (other) PSP’s on the consumers as well 
as on the merchant side of the four corner model, which is the core of iDEAL. The iDEAL scheme  
coordinates the activities of the supply and demand side of e-payments with iDEAL. Experience shows 
that involvement of all stakeholders in the value chain is crucial for the success of a payment product. 
More in general, this holds true for coordination of different stakeholders where a good infrastructure for 
the consultation of, and for the discussion between these stakeholders is needed in order to avoid high 
transaction costs with implementation of a common product standard. These institutionalised structures of 
consultation are referred to as “matching zones” (Den Butter and Ten Wolde, 2014) and the Dutch 
Payments Association (“Betaalvereniging”) acted as such matching zone in the design and 
implementation of iDEAL 
 
The figures 1 and 2 illustrate the growth of iDEAL and the impact on the market as most preferred 
payment option of Dutch consumers for e-commerce.  
 















Currently non-banks PSP’s facilitate iDEAL payments in about 60 countries Another example of a 
standard which reduces transaction costs and leaves competition unaffected are payment platforms 
delivered by payment aggregators such as Adyen, PPRO and Worldpay Here all different payments 
systems that sellers deal with in international trade are brought together through an interface in one 
standard. 
 
However, such platforms offering payment services due to economies of scale could  lead to a "winner  
takes all" situation. Then a monopolistic position is sometimes inevitable. This is the case in China, for 
example, with Alipay, the payment service that is linked to the Chinese internet platform TaoBao (and 
internationally: Alibaba). In all such cases the dilemma for the regulating authorities is to what extent the 
positive welfare effects of the monopoly or cartel in terms of lower transaction costs outweigh the 




The purpose of government intervention and regulation of external effects is to internalize these effects. 
For example, negative external effects can occur with innovations that make the payments system 
increasingly complex. Because of this complexity, a shock can quickly move through the financial system, 
which may bring about contagion. This negative externality can be very harmful to society as the negative 
consequences of contagion are passed to the society. We know this from the credit crisis. In this context 
Caballero and Simsek (2013) speak of a complexity externality. 
 
On the other hand, innovation in the payments system can also have positive external effects, namely 
when knowledge investments in more efficient payment methods not only benefit those who develop the 
knowledge, but when, through knowledge transfer, others can also benefit from this. In innovation policy, 
it is customary to internalize these positive external effects, which lead to underinvestment in innovations, 
via subsidy or tax facilities. 
 
A related reason for government intervention is when standards are anchored in such a way that it is 
impossible for individual innovators to introduce a different and more efficient standard. Then government 
policy is needed to break through such a lock-in, for example by organizing dialogue between the various 
stakeholders as it happens in the Dutch Payments Association. 
 
Restoring information symmetry 
 
Information asymmetry whereby not everyone can have the same information, is often a consequence of 
the high transaction costs involved in gathering information. Various forms of internet fraud, such as 
phishing and invoice fraud, use the incomplete information among users in the payments system. It is up 
to the providers of payment services to eliminate this information asymmetry as much as possible. 
However, the identification of hidden costs for consumers in the case of misleading information by 
payment service providers is also a task for regulatory authorities, i.e. in the two tier regulation in the 




Innovations in the payments system are indirectly important for the monetary policy which is in Euroland 
currently outsourced to the ECB and has the objective of keeping inflation around 2%. In addition to 
interest rates, the extent to which money is used for transactions - the turnover rate of money - is decisive 
for reaching the inflation target. To this end, it is necessary to determine what is considered money - the 
money definition - and where the money creation is located. When innovations in the payments system 
lead to payments by ‘money’ from non-banks, these non-banks should be given the role of money-
creating institutions and as such be placed under the supervision of the monetary authorities. This should 
therefore for example also apply to miners and creators of cryptocurrencies if this is understood as 
transaction ‘money’. Moreover, in all these forms of ‘money’, the question arises to what extent they 
should be covered by the deposit guarantee scheme. If not, it should clearly be stated that these means 




Two future developments in the payments system will make an important contribution to the further 
reduction of transaction costs but will also require regulation from the point of view of the aforementioned 
aspects of public interest: (i) instant payments and (ii) the payment directive PSD2. 
Instant payments 
Whereas presently a processing of a payment may last a day and the European payment system is 
closed in the weekend, an instant payment will be processed and received within a few seconds (24 
hours a day and 365 days a year), just as quickly as an email. In this case, liquidity is immediately 
available to the creditor, which reduces the working capital and reduces the costs for cash management. 
The money received can thus be immediately used again for payments, which increases the turnover rate 
of money. Thanks to this dynamic efficiency, the transaction costs will decrease throughout the economy. 
For example, it is plausible that paying for purchases between private individuals, for example at market 
places, which are still often done in cash - and therefore expensive and cumbersome - will soon be 
settled via the mobile phone. Also (large) companies and governments (think of the tax authorities) will 
soon receive instant payments from their customers, also in weekends. 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch National Forum on the Payments System, chaired by the Dutch Central 
Bank (DNB), in a decision in May 2015 (DNB, 2015), acknowledged the importance of an accelerated 
payments system for the public interest. Since June 2015, a completely new payment infrastructure has 
been set up under the supervision of the ‘Betaalvereniging’, making ínstant payments possible in May 
2019 (Betaalvereniging, 2018). Both providers and users of payment services are intensively involved in 
this project. In most countries in the euro area, preparations are made for the introduction of instant 
payments. The ECB has decided to adjust its settlement system, in which banks settle their mutual 
positions, to the new, future situation. With Spain and Belgium, the Netherlands is unique in this respect 
in the sense that it is a collective solution per country, creating direct access for all customers of the 
payments service providers. This brings about large positive network externalities. Cooperation on the 
infrastructure therefore pays off. Instant payment will be within a few years the new normal, not only in the 
Netherlands, but also in other euro countries. 
The revised Payments Services Directive (PSD2) 
A second important change in the payments system is the implementation of the revised Payments 
Services Directive (PSD2)  in all European countries. The deadline for implementation was 13 January 
2018. At the end of May 2018 17 member states have implemented the PSD2 with full transposition, 4 
with partial transposition and 7 without transposition completed (among which The Netherlands).   
With the PSD2 the European Commission aims to stimulate innovation and to promote competition 
between providers and thereby increase the choice for end-users. The idea is to make online payments 
for consumers easier, faster and safer. The PSD2 provides two new forms of service: payment initiation 
and account information services. Through these services account holders can instruct third parties to 
make payments on their behalf or to aggregate data from the payment account (for example, but not only, 
for household bookkeeping). Accounting payment service providers are obliged to grant these third 
parties free access to the payment account of their customers. The customer determines who gets 
access to his or her payment account. Figure 3 outlines the new situation. The left part of the diagram 
illustrates the current situation: the account holder gets access to his own payment account via his online 
or mobile banking channel. In the PSD2 situation (the right-hand part) the account holder can provide a 
third party, the so-called Third Party Provider (TPP), a Payment Initiation Services Provider (PISP) or an 
Account Information Services Provider (AISP), access to his or her account via a separate interface 
outside the banking access channel. 
 
Figure 3  Payments system before and post PSD2  
 
            Currently                                 Post PSD2 
 
This development puts the existing customer relationship of the banks under pressure. To ensure the 
safety of these new services, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has drawn up secondary legislation 
in the form of regulatory technical standards (RTS) on strong customer authentication (SCA) and common 
and secure communication (CSC). From the public interest of combating fraud, this regulation aims to 
mitigate the risk of unauthorized access of the third party to the consumer's payment account. The RTS 
allows the TPP to let  the consumer enter the personal access codes on a non-banking website which 
provides this service (the so-called “direct access” method). In the Netherlands, consumers are always 
advised never to do this to prevent (phishing) fraud. To avoid these risks banks are in favour of the so 
called “redirect access“ method, entering the personal codes in the online banking portal, therefore 
leaving for a few seconds the app of the TPP and then quickly return. The current discussion focuses on 
whether both methods can bring at smooth customer journey (and which is the preferred access method). 
However, iDEAL has shown that a redirect to the online banking portal does not hamper a smooth 
customer journey, keeping consumers as much as possible away from potential phishing fraud. This may 
serve as an example for third party services in the context of the PSD2. The final RTS was published on 
13 March 2018. Eighteen months later, on 14 September 2019, the RTS start to apply.  
In the case of the Netherlands, the argument that the number of providers of payment methods will 
increase as a result of PSD2, is less relevant, because iDEAL already offers such a secure standard 
payments method, whereby cooperation and competition between banks and (60) non-banks run parallel. 
These could offer their own iDEAL service, making use of the name of the brand (logo) and the scale of 
reach. Nevertheless, the pallet of payment methods and providers will also increase for the Dutch. New 
applications of payments and services based on payment data are therefore to be foreseen. Automated 
analyses in combination with algorithms and robotic advice can reinforce this service. As a result, 
transaction costs for consumers may decrease because new and more efficient services are offered, and 
also because, for example, the search costs for these types of services are decreasing. This policy of 
"open banking" can therefore enhance welfare, which mirrors the public interest in executing this new 
directive 
Pitfalls of PDS2 
However, there is some doubt whether these welfare benefits can be realized in practice. For instance 
Reynolds (2017) argues that open banking, in addition to benefits, also entails risks for the consumer 
Information asymmetry 
If there is insufficient transparency about the costs and activities of the new providers, conflicts of interest 
may arise. The party that avails of the customer's data may have another and even opposite interest in 
using these data than the customer. For example, the provider can use the lead in information to seduce 
the consumer to make purchases that are profitable for the provider platform rather than for the customer 
(in getting as much as commission as possible). This abuse of information asymmetry can strengthen a 
possible lock-in situation for the customer and can undermine privacy protection. It is therefore very 
important that proper, orderly and transparent information is given to customers, such as about privacy 
risks (of which the GDPR will be of help). From a social point of view, these advanced payment 
possibilities may entail more digital exclusion resulting in enhanced inequality. This is the case if open 
banking does not result in a welfare increase for the non-digitally educated - in the Netherlands 
approximately 1.2 million citizens. Apparently from the perspective of the public interest these innovations 
in the payments system call for broad financial education. 
Challenges for competition 
The PSD2 can have a major change in the position of the banks in the payments system. 88 percent of 
the largest European banks foresee that PSD2 influences their business operations and 68 percent have 
concerns about loss of customer relations (PWC, 2016). On the other hand, banks, because of the 
relationship they already have with their customers, are well positioned so that they can maintain a good 
position (McKinsey, 2017). The prospects to keep that position are to be enhanced if the banks continue 
to provide added value for customers with additional services. After all, they already have the payment 
transaction data in house. 
With respect to these services there has been an uneven playing field for years between the BigTechs 
and payment service providers that is expected to be dissolved with the PSD2. However, when the 
BigTechs take control of the global payments market, a concentration risk arises with a strong commercial 
focus. Several public interests mentioned above, such as the accessibility and affordability of payment 
services for vulnerable groups, then come under pressure. There are major challenges for safeguarding 
these public interests. 
Over the past decades, the ecosystem of payment transactions has evolved, through a combination of 
cooperation and competition ('co-opetition'), into a stable stand with few or no disruptions. Within this 
network ecosystem, many parties provide specialized services that are crucial for end users, but are often 
invisible. The key element here is cooperation through agreements systems (schemes), such as those 
with Mastercard, Visa and iDEAL. The parties work closely together within these systems in areas such 
as standards and then compete with each other using the same standards. The parties that are going to 
offer the new PSD2 services are not looking for such a form of cooperation yet. However, the market for 
payment services can be seen as a two sided market, and in such a two sided market cooperation is a 
necessary condition to achieve maximum reduction of transaction costs. That seems still a major 




History teaches that innovations in payment transactions lower transaction costs and thus contribute to 
prosperity. Then it is necessary to recognize that various aspects of public interest are at stake in these 
innovations. For good regulation it is essential to know which arguments for government intervention 
apply and what kind of regulation is warranted in each situation where the public interest is at stake. 
Instant payment and PSD2 will significantly change the payment landscape. It may bring about a further 
contribution of the payments system to prosperity via lower transaction costs. In order to grasp this 
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